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Global Innovation Law
P. SEAN MORRIS*
This Article is about opening up a debate on global innovation law. The
Article argues that a new hybrid area of transglobal law has emerged in the
past decade due to the rise of various disruptive and technological challenges to law beyond the state. As such, the Article argues that global innovation law is a new field that encapsulates the dynamics of law making and
regulatory governance in how law operates in a transglobal environment.
With the rapid changes in law and regulation to meet the demands of the
global economy—the interaction of law and these changes at the domestic
and international level can no longer be subjected to the interaction of domestic and international law. Although, there have been efforts to engage in
a steady stream of scholarship to address similar developments, whether as
“global administrative law,” “legal pluralism,” “transnational law,”
amongst others—they do not capture the dynamics of how law meets innovation as a result of disruptive technology. Hence, global innovation law is
meant to address some of these challenges by looking at the confluence of
globalization, innovation, and disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, data governance, and the financial technology sector. The premise of this Article is therefore to map the foundations of global innovation
law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the beginning of the internet disruptive technological innovation—
there was Napster—the all-encompassing music sharing portal that used
MP3 file sharing technology to share music globally as it trespassed on every
conceivable copyright rule and norm. Ultimately, Napster could not defend
itself from the music industry under the copyright laws of the US and it eventually collapsed.1 Napster was one of the first efforts at promoting a disruptive technological method through the internet. However, Napster was also a
prime target of regulators and the music industry giants who used the strong
arm of the law to rein in such disruptions. However, despite the tragedy of
Napster and the promises of internet revolution, more and more disruptive
technological innovation over the internet emerges with severe implications
for international legal relations.2 At present, this disruptive technological revolution is especially evident in how areas such as artificial intelligence, algorithmic governance, platform governance, blockchain technology, financial
technology (Fintech), and big data via the use of technical devices, shapes
the global economy.3
1. See A & M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Michael Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief Analysis of A
& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 12 (2002) (depicting how
Napster was on the one hand seen as an “evil incarnate”, and, on the other, some copyright
holders were positively optimistic “to the rampant file sharing that had taken the Internet by
storm”).
2. See Henry Gladney, Digital Intellectual Property: Controversial and International Aspects, 24 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 47, 76–79 (2000) (setting out some of the complexities
of international legal reactions relating to “IP leakage” on the internet); Jeffrey Dodes, Beyond
Napster, Beyond the United States: The Technological and International Legal Barriers to
On-Line Copyright Enforcement, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 279, 295–301 (2002) (looking at some of
the extraterritorial aspects of the Napster case); Antonio Segura-Serrano, Internet Regulation
and the Role of International Law, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 191, 205 (2006)
(nothing how states embraced sovereignty over “technological innovation.”); P. Sean Morris,
Pirates of the Internet, At Intellectual Property’s End with Torrents and Challenges for Choice
of Law, 17 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 282, 298–99 (2009) (highlighting some jurisdictional
problems for copyright infringement over the internet); Stephen Bright, The Current State of
BitTorrent in International Law: Why Copyright Law is Ineffective and What Needs to
Change, 17 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 265, 287 (2011) (suggesting the need to reform
international law to better reflect developments in intellectual property and internet infringement); Stephen Small, Bitcoin: The Napster of Currency, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 581 (2015)
(generally arguing how the rise of Bitcoin presents the same challenges as Napster).
3. In some ways the very essence of technological revolution since the commercial
days of the internet relies on big data and technical devices (such as computers). Moreover,
the concept of artificial intelligence—is in some ways, rather artificial, when other components such as algorithm or machine deep learning are considered. Thus, in this article, I employ
a one-size fits all approach to the concept of artificial intelligence—but not a substitute for the
main concept of global innovation (law) that I am advancing in the article. I will however,
discuss a narrow framework of artificial intelligence as part of the global innovation (law)
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These areas have been some of the fastest growing regulatory challenges and the necessity of law because as a form of disruptive technological
innovation they create several legal disorders. But, more formally, the question is, how should these challenges be seen in light of innovation and approaches to law in the established global legal order.4 We have witnessed
these developments in a number of areas such as artificial intelligence, algorithms, data governance, financial technology (Fintech), the platform economy, digital copyright, and a host of other disruptive technologies5 tend to
create jurisdictional issues in contemporary international law. Not only have
these innovations been a common issue in the domestic paradigm of states
but they have also been elevated to the global arena where they intersect with
the traditional domain of international law. The convergence of disruptive
laws and international law has actually brought on a new system of law that
has gained little traction in the academic debate—global innovation law.
Global innovation law is a complex phenomenon brought about by technological changes often promulgated by private actors in the economy but
requires the public nature of law to enforce or safeguard proprietary interests.
Global innovation law therefore, on the one hand, intersects with technological and proprietary functions of law, and on the other, forms a governance
structure beyond the territorial boundaries of states.
This, therefore, gives rise to questions of how traditional international
law should respond to global innovation law, whether global innovation law
is a normative structure creating new obligations for states, and questions
about the private initiatives behind the technological and proprietary functions of global innovation law. To be clear, global innovation law is not about

ecosystem later in this article. For some discussions on artificial intelligence from policy and
regulatory perspectives see, e.g., Olivia Erdelyi & Judy Goldsmith, Regulating Artificial Intelligence: Proposal for a Global Solution, 2018 AAAI/ACM CONF. ON AI ETHICS & SOC’Y 1
(proposing the creation of an International Artificial Intelligence Organization – IAIO),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3263992
[https://perma.cc/VN46VANE]; ADAM THIERER ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (2017); Ryan
Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399
(2017); Riika Koulu, Human Control over Automation: EU Policy and AI Ethics, EUR J. L.
STUD. 9, 35 (2020) (arguing for instance that despite the AI policy strategies of the EU, “AI
problems, it seems, are problems created by the technology, not by humans, and these problems should primarily be addressed by product liability and data protection regimes, i.e. only
certain areas of law”).
4. For discussions on disruption theory see e.g., Joseph Bower & Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43;
Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011); Ronald Gilson, Locating Innovation:
The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 885 (2010); Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 175 (2014).
5. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Second Digital Disruption: Streaming Data and the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555 (2019).
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regulating how “technological law”6 forms part of an overarching administrative system. Rather, global innovation law relates to the new dynamics of
how the different disruptive regimes such as technological law, data governance, Fintech, artificial intelligence, platform governance, amongst others
forms the basis of a new system of law at the international level.
My emphasis on the international level is because of the fact that in
these modern times—the second decade of the twenty-first century—law is
increasingly global. In other words, law is no longer solely confined to the
internal territorial boundaries of a state—rather, law has become extraterritorial7 and with extraterritoriality becomes a concern of the modern global
law. It is at this complex juncture of modern global law that, I would argue,
incorporates the different provinces of global law such as transnational law,
global constitutionalism,8 global administrative law, global legal pluralism
or global governance.9 The province of global administrative law, for instance, has gained a serious amount of exposure in the academic literature as
it purports to address how to ground different administrative governance organizations or their regulatory competence at the global level10 and their fit
6. See Shin-Yi Peng, The Rule of Law in Times of Technological Uncertainty: Is
International Economic Law Ready For Emerging Supervisory Trends?, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L.
1, 12 (2019) (discussing especially the rule of law in times of technological uncertainty); Tibor
Tajti, The Impact of Technology on Access to Law and the Concomitant Repercussions: Pass,
Present, and the Future (From the 1980s to Present Time), 24 UNIF. L. REV. 396 (2019); Mark
Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology is Faster than the
Law?, 6 AM. UNIV. BUS. L. REV. 561 (2017); Iain Sheridan, Financial Technology and Global
Capital Markets: The Impact of Pro-Enterprise Regulation and English Law, 13 CAP. MKTS.
L.J. 587 (2018); Riika Koulu, Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolution: Smart Contracts
as an Alternative to Enforcement, 13 SCRIPTED 40 (2016); Anna Butenko & Pieere Larouche,
Regulation for Innovativeness or Regulation of Innovation?, 7 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 52
(2015); Joel Trachtman, International Legal Control of Domestic Administrative Action, 17 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 753 (2014); ROGER BROWNSWORD & MORAG GOODWIN, LAW AND
TECHNOLOGIES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012); Lyria B. Moses, Agents of Change:
How the Law ‘Copes’ with Technological Change, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 763 (2011); SUSAN
BRENNER, LAW IN AN ERA OF “SMART” TECHNOLOGY (2007).
7. See, e.g., KBR Inc, R (On the Application of) v The Director of the Serious Fraud
Office [2018] EWHC (Admin) 2368 (relating to the extraterritorial effect of certain provisions
of the Criminal Justice Act (1987)) (UK).
8. See, e.g., David Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1163 (2011); Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, Harmonising
Global Constitutionalism, 5 GLOB. CONSTITUTIONALISM 173 (2016).
9. See RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtmann eds., 2009) [hereinafter “Ruling the World”].
10. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). See also Nico Krisch & Benedict
Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2006) (“The concept of global administrative law
begins from the twin ideas that much global governance can be understood as administration,
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into the globalization narrative.11 The narrative of global administrative law,
however, has fizzled out, and the rise of technological challenges beyond the
state requires a new narrative.
Let me narrow the meaning of globalization in this introductory argument to that of “global governance”12—where one can argue that in essence
global governance relates to how states assemble in international cooperation
to harmonize the common good of the world order. Alternatively, one can
endorse any of the multiple constructions of global governance such as a
sharp rise in “economic globalization, and everything associated with it, was
allowed to thrive and develop because it took place in a relatively open, relatively peaceful, relatively liberal institutionalized world order.”13 Whichever position we ultimately agree is global governance—whether it is world
politics14 or the transposition of domestic regulatory structures to international law15—the idea of global governance is well grounded in academic
discourse, private actors in the global economy, and state16 practice. It is not
the position of this Article to challenge the idea of global governance, rather,
it is necessary to refer to global governance as part of the project of globalization and as such influences how other systems of law and regulation in the
global economy manifest into, or, can be christen as “global ___ law”. It is
in this vein that the idea of global governance must be understood as it helps
to reflect how changes on the global legal landscape occur as a result of many
factors including for the purposes of this Article—disruptive technology.
Thus, it is a matter of how we account for such changes in the global economy and the relation of those changes to international law—which continues
on a path of fragmentation.
The many facets of the new international law (fragmentation) that
global governance represents include trade law, transnational law, global administrative law, and as this Article is proposing global innovation law. The

and that such administration is often organized and shaped by principles of an administrative
law character.”).
11. See, e.g., Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and
Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006); DAVID BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social
Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260 (2009).
12. David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827
(2008).
13. David Held, Elements of a Theory of Global Governance, 42 PHIL. & SOC.
CRITICISM 837, 839 (2016).
14. Lawrence Finkelstein, What is Global Governance?, 1 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 367
(1995).
15. Martti Koskenniemi, Global Governance and Public International Law, 37
KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 241 (2004).
16. Shahar Hameiri & Lee Jones, Global Governance as State Transformation, 64
POL. STUD. 793 (2016).
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changes that are taking place within the new international law under the umbrella of “global law” is the fact that such transformation represents the previous incarnation of “old international law” such as the law of nations in the
long nineteenth century,17world law in parts of the twentieth century, and
nowadays global law in the twenty-first century. As a twenty-first century
novelty that is partially based on globalization—then we must embrace the
“global” in the new facets of international law—and in this regard, not only
should the “global” represent “globalism”—the expanding network of cooperation—but also the ability to be disruptive, that is challenge existing norms.
From an international law perspective, the idea of global administrative law
had been disruptive in that it challenged the classical models of international
law.18 However, global administrative law, in my view failed to grasp the
fast-moving changes in the international legal environment as a result of technology, and therefore gives way to a new narrative as I am positing.
Global innovation law is however a completely different province when
compared to say global administrative law—or at least, that is how I am conceptualizing global innovation law. Thus, if global administrative law is a
normative domain—then global innovation law is a system. As a system, I
will later argue, global innovation law harnesses the practices and existing
rules of the modern international legal order as opposed to setting up a normative base that can essentially raise more questions than answers. In other
words, the rules of the games for global innovation law are already in existence—whether through international organizations such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO); the United Nations; the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), or international tribunals. Thus, if global innovation
law is seen as part of the paradigm of modern global law, then, the purpose
of global innovation law is to harness the disruptive laws and their global
impact. Global innovation law has many facets and demonstrates the many
dimensions of innovators and innovations that must adhere to a rule of law
system. As a system—global innovation law must contend with the realities
of disruptions and technological innovations where the rule of law can sometimes be murky or absent.
But it is this murky world of facts and realities of the technological innovation sphere and the necessities of the rule of law that can be conceived
17. I am primarily referring to how international law as such practiced in the nineteenth century to include some of the ideals of previous international legal orders such as
during the medieval and early scholastic era where such polities matched the transformation
of international law in the nineteenth century. For further readings see generally, Lauren Benton & Adam Cluclow, Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law, in CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE WORLD (2015); HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN
EUROPE AND AMERICA: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842
(1845); PAOLO AMOROSA, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: HOW JAMES
BROWN SCOTT MADE FRANCISCO DE VITORIA THE FOUNDER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2019).
18. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20
EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (2009).
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not only as special, but also as the need for a new framework to capture how
law responds to technological innovation in the global economic system.
Given that some of the realities include the domestic private law system that
deals with intellectual property and technological innovation or their counterpart at the international legal level such as the WTO system of GATS,
TRIPS or even amendments to the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic19 that
take into account self-driving cars—the pattern of global innovation law begins to emerge.
Although different facets of global innovation law such as financial
technology or artificial intelligence have been addressed in different scholarships—no single source has yet to address this phenomenon.20 It is that weakness in the legal literature that this Article aims to capture and at the same
time provides a foundation of global innovation law. The existence of global
innovation law, then, can be interpreted and formalized as part of the changing (disruptive) nature of international law.
II. TOWARD THE SYSTEM OF GLOBAL INNOVATION LAW
To pin down a solid definition of “global innovation law” is perhaps the
ideal thing to do in an Article of this nature.21 However, that task is not as
easy as it may appear.22 This is because, a rock-solid definition of global innovation law is still not possible—because it is an evolving system, and
moreover, there is the need to be flexible when discussing any new system.
In this regard, what I am proposing is not so much a definition of global
innovation law (either in the above introduction or in this part of the article)—rather, I am proposing some guiding structures that can capture the essence of global innovation law in light of “law and technological change.”23
Thus, one could agree that global innovation law is a system of rules that
19. U.N. Secretary-General, Convention on Road Traffic, UN.Doc, C.N.162.2015
(Nov. 8, 1968); Nynke Vellinga, Automated Driving and Its Challenges to International Traffic Law: Which Way to Go?, 11 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 257 (2019).
20. But see JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS
OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (2019) (framing disruptive technologies from a commerce
angle).
21. When Jessup coined the term “transnational law” or at least popularized it, he
associated its meaning to: “include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend
national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.” See PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 2 (1956).
22. But see my introductory remarks where I made attempts at setting out definitions
of global innovation law. See also Aurelien Portuese & Julien Pillot, The Case for an Innovation Principle: A Comparative Law and Economics Analysis, 15 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON.
L. 214 (2018).
23. Lyria Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological Change?, 8 MINN.
J.L., SCI. & TECH. 589 (2007).
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demarcates the legal operations of technology and innovation in the global
economic system.
As a system, global innovation law is exemplified by disruptive technologies in many areas such as autonomous robotic system, block-chain,
Fintech, artificial intelligence, platform governance, deep learning, machine
learning, algorithm, biomedical innovation, patents and nanotechnology, big
data (governance), amongst others. Through these disruptions, global innovation law engages with international law as a conduit of protecting and harnessing private proprietary rights and innovation through how states cooperate in the global economic system. In a sense, global innovation law through
the dynamics of disruptive technological innovation brings about changes in
the global economic system, but at the same time, by embracing the traditional structure of international law—global innovation law also represents
continuity.
Unlike other systems of law that manifested in the international legal
literature in recent decades where they detach themselves from the corpus of
international law or came to be seen as “hybrids”—global innovation law
fully embraces the traditional structures of international law. By embracing
the core of international law such as its principles and customary nature—
global innovation law acts as a catalyst for the interpretation of disruptive
technologies in international law. To give an example of what I am referring
to here—take the dispute settlement system (DSU) of the WTO which provides for in Article 3.2 that the “dispute settlement system of the WTO is a
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system.”24 In the same vein, global innovation law should be seen as
the main road that leads all disruptive technologies operating in the global
legal sphere to the central tenets of international law. This is necessary so
that when those disruptive technologies raise questions of “rights” or “obligations” beyond the state—international law can properly address them albeit under the framework of global innovation law. This is part of the continuity argument of international law—and it is necessary to avoid some of the
pitfalls regarding the ideas of new systems of law at the global level that
contributes to those new systems of lex specialis or not part of the corpus of
traditional international law. The continuity thesis, I posit, requires international law to be aligned with its traditional principles but have the flexibility
to incorporate modern legal challenges to those principles.
It is equally important to understand that global innovation law as I am
developing in this Article has linkages to the domestic private law systems
of nation states. By this, I am referring to the fact that it is constituent domes-

24. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 app. 10.
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tic regulation such as in the area of “virtual financial transactions,” intellectual property, contracts,25 torts26 or on “data” that governs the system of innovation law and how that system gives rise to international legal norms.
Moreover, it is domestic legal principles that are often taken into account
when breaches or acts of illegality by private parties occur in another state.27
For instance, on a number of occasions, private entities and individuals have
used the domestic law of states to initiate legal proceedings for breaches or
illegality that took place in another state.28 In recent times we have seen that
the incentives to use domestic law for such breaches have taken place regarding the illegal use of trademarks29 or historically with antitrust in the United
States and more recently securities in financial matters.30 Although the reliance on domestic law is often a one-sided affair—in that fingers can be
pointed to a single state—the larger picture here is that such jurisdictional
questions often arise that challenge the boundaries of innovation as seen, for
example, in a recent case relating to the legal standards on patentability.31
This is where domestic private law is used as an attempt to interfere in the
sovereignty of another nation, which is actually a signal that the traditional
state-centered nature of international law requires a framework for the modern challenges of disruptive technologies and international law.
For example, the current realm of international intellectual property law
has most of the core tenets that can be linked to global innovation law. International intellectual property law, which, primarily is based on the TRIPS
Agreement, WIPO administered treaties, and/or principles of international
law, it can be argued, contain elements for regulating contemporary global
innovation.32 However, the relationship between TRIPS for example and
global innovation is more complex given that TRIPS is “trade-based” in that
25. Lauren Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017).
26. James Henderson, Tort vs. Technology: Accommodating Disruptive Innovation,
47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1145 (2015).
27. In the area of copyright, US courts have attempted to extend its copyright laws in
transnational disputes in cases such as in Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67
(2d Cir. 1988); Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1998). For some discussions see Gregory Swank, Extending the Copyright Act Abroad: The
Need for Courts to Reevaluate the Predicate-Act Doctrine, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 237 (2012).
28. Subafilms, Ltd., v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
29. Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016).
30. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
31. See e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (where the court
determined the obviousness criteria for patent under US law). This case is important as it has
implications beyond the United States for other countries that must strive to “innovate,” for
similar discussions see Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact of U.S. Supreme
Court Patent Law on Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation Ecologies, 15 HEALTH
L.J. 247 (2007).
32. Katherine Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861 (2009).
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it orients towards markets33 and newer challenges such as the disruptive technologies thesis of this Article does not sufficiently fit into the TRIPS paradigm. Moreover, the ability of the WTO vis a vis the TRIPS to make new
rules regarding developments in intellectual property or innovation has been
in a state of ‘law making deficit’.34 Yet, when we speak of “innovation”35 the
linkages with intellectual property cannot be ignored.36 Intellectual property
is on the one hand synonymous with innovation especially in the field of
patents37 (especially from a technological perspective)38 and, on the other,
the modern challenges to international law, whether by Fintech,39 mobile
money,40 data,41 high frequency trading (HFT), or the problematic notion of
copyright fair use,42 also have underlying elements relating to intellectual
property. And, it goes without saying that copyright matters form one of the
core tenets of intellectual property rights.

33. See id.
34. On this argument see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Fostering Dynamic Innovation,
Development and Trade: Intellectual Property as a Case Study in Global Administrative Law,
2009 ACTA JURIDICA 237 (2009).
35. Although my arguments in this article concern “technological innovation” – innovation also occurs in other areas where intellectual property is concerned, moreover, innovation as a concept is wide enough to factor in other developments, for a theoretical guidance
see e.g., Robert Edgell & Roland Vogl, A Theory of Innovation: Benefit, Harm, and Legal
Regimes, 5 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 21 (2013).
36. See e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting that “[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system.”); Philip Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property
Policy 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003); Geoffrey Scott, A Protocol for Evaluating Changing
Global Attitudes Toward Innovation and Intellectual Property Regimes 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
1165 (2011); Daniel Gervais, Challenges in Intellectual Property Governance: Providing the
Right Incentives in the Quest for Global Innovation, 4 TRADE L. & DEV. 385 (2012); Carl
Mair, Taking Technological Infrastructure Seriously: Standards, Intellectual Property and
Open Access, 32 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 59 (2016); Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrrimore
Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism 128 YALE L. J. 544 (2019).
37. Jonathan M. Barrett, Patent Tigers: The New Geography of Global Innovation 2
CRITERION: J. INNOVATION 429 (2017).
38. Deborah Strumsky et al, Using Patent Technology Codes to Study Technological
Change 21 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 267 (2012); Bernard Chao, Horizontal Innovation and Interface Patents 2016 WIS. L. REV. 287 (2016); Esteban Donoso, Application of a
Mechanism of Proportional Rewards Towards Global Innovation, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP.
& ENT. L. 105 (2014).
39. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO.
L. J. 235 (2019).
40. David Myerson, The Next Global Disruptive Innovation: Can Mobile Money
Make the Journey Upmarket to Disrupt the Financial Services Industry?, 39 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 309 (2019).
41. Jerome Reichmann & Pamela Samuelsson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?,
50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997).
42. Peter Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111
(2019).
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The TRIPS Agreement for its part alludes to the relationship between
innovation and intellectual property for instance noting that technology43 is
“enjoyable without discrimination[;]”44 and that include the existence of “an
inventive step”45 as a rationale for “industrial application.”46 These TRIPS
paradigms are an indication that not only do intellectual property and innovation have the same end goal but also represents part of the initial groundwork for global innovation law. Moreover, TRIPS flexibilities,47 such as
those relating to compulsory licensing or exclusions from patentability, fit
into the narrative of the disruptive nature of global innovation law; however,
the drawback with that argument is that TRIPS is based on trade norms whilst
disruptive technologies are increasingly seen as a challenge to the status quo,
including standard trade norms and market access.
By taking lessons from the patent system of innovation, the concept of
innovation in this context should also be a part of the new technological innovations of disruptive paradigms. Furthermore, global innovation law
shares a relationship with the global economy. This is, in that the different
facets of the global economy that rely on innovation such as digital trade,
Internet of Things (IoT), the platform economy,48 intermediated securities,49
high frequency trading, data, artificial intelligence,50 amongst others, initially
coordinated under domestic private law rules in order to perform economic
functions or offer services on a global level. Thus, domestic legal principles
are in effect coordinating the global economy as a result of innovation, yet,
there is no actual system of global innovation law. Introducing the concept
of global innovation law to coordinate legal activities (both domestic and international) allows for the adaptability of the different paradigms that similarly in Jessup’s word transcends national frontiers and requires the inclusion
of private and public international law51 to fit into this new paradigm of
global innovation law.

43. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. ELIZABETH SIEW-KUAN NG & ALBERT GUANGZHOU HU, FLEXIBILITIES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TRIPS: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN ASIA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Elizabeth Siew-Kuan Ng eds., 2018).
48. Julie Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017).
49. Ferdisha Snagg & Sarah Green, Distributed Ledger Technology and Intermediated Securities, in INTERMEDIATION AND BEYOND 337 (2019).
50. Teresa Ballell, Legal Challenge of Artificial Intelligence: Modelling the Disruptive Features of Emerging Technologies and Assessing Their Possible Legal Impact 24 UNIF.
L. REV. 302 (2019); THOMAS WISCHMEYER & TIMO RADEMACHER, REGULATING ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (2020).
51. JESSUP, supra note 21.
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These guiding frameworks for global innovation law do have some connotations with the Jessupian notion of transnational law in that global innovation law relates to all forms of disruptive technologies that interact with
domestic legal rules, such as intellectual property and international legal
norms, to address modern challenges to international law. The modern challenges to international law requires that there is a firm understanding of how
disruptive technologies are intertwined with domestic legal rules. But, at the
same time, the influence of the domestic legal system on international legal
norms indicates that global innovation law is an interdependent system of
domestic legal rules. As an independent system, these rules pertain mostly to
technology, innovation, and other legal obligations regarding questions of
jurisdiction and regulation beyond the territorial borders of the state. In that
regard, those rules must help interpret private actions or illegal conduct in
another state without trespassing in that state’s sovereignty.
Given that this Article is not about reforming international law, but rather acknowledging the various challenges and new paradigms52 as a result
of disruptive innovations and their relations to law in an international context,
then the simplistic function of global innovation law ought to be replicating
the traditional role of international law. If global innovation law replicates
traditional international law while at the same time highlighting the importance and relevance of modern challenges and disruptive technologies
then international law would become adaptive, interactive, and less state centred but also include the relevance of disruptive communities and innovators
to ease the transition from domestic regulation to global regulation. The proliferation of disruptive technologies and their impact on the law represent
both a desire to engage with states and other actors in the international legal
process on the new paradigm that global innovation law represents. At the
same time, this new paradigm of global innovation law is part of the ordolegal53 complex of contemporary ius gentium where the lawmaking process is
no longer state-centred, but increasingly relies on the dynamics of the global
economy with private actors.
III. SAMPLE REGIMES IN THE SYSTEM OF GLOBAL INNOVATION LAW:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ALGORITHMS, AND FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY
Although the notion of artificial intelligence54 and its relation to law has
experienced a rejuvenation in the legal academic circles in recent years due
52. Yu, supra note 42 (discussing new paradigms in global copyright law).
53. P. Sean Morris, Ordolegality (Working Paper, 2019) (on file with author).
54. It is not my intention to go into a conceptual dissection of artificial intelligence
in this part of the article unlike my previous foray into global innovation law as set out in the
introduction and the previous section. Unlike global innovation law which is a new proposition
– artificial intelligence, for good measure is a term that has been in existence for a while, as
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to disruptive technologic innovation, in fact, it has a long history in relation
to different areas of intellectual property, early advances in technology, and
general legal reasoning.55 Taking this into account and, for the purposes of
the discussion in the section of the article, where artificial intelligence is one
of the examples of global innovation law–-the narrative is on recent approaches to artificial intelligence and also its connection to international
law.56 In other words, my inquiry is about framing some of the arguments
across sample regimes that also require or take into account artificial intelligence. In this regard, although the concept of artificial intelligence is broad
enough to include, among other things, automation, algorithmic, big data, AI
governance, and regulation, my aim is not to focus on those concepts as such.
Rather, I want to start from two positions: regulation and governance relating
to artificial intelligence as a legal concept and an underlying technology in
relation to the other regimes of global innovation law. The arguments in this
section are only for demonstrative purposes-–a sample–and therefore, I want

attested by different fields whether in the social or physical sciences. Most of the sources I
came across attributed the origins of the concept to a paper that first appeared in 1955, see
JOHN MCCARTHY ET AL, A PROPOSAL FOR THE DARTMOUTH SUMMER RESEARCH PROJECT ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1955) (they in part define the concept of artificial intelligence as
“that of making a machine behave in ways that would be intelligent if a human were so behaving”). See also Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433 (1950);
Calo, supra note 3, at 404 (describing artificial intelligence “as a set of techniques aimed at
approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition using machines”). Due to the rise
of technology in the post internet world, some courts in modern times have at least explicitly
acknowledged that the concept of artificial intelligence is used to drive or support technological innovation, see e.g.., Yellobrix, Inc. v. Yellobrick Solutions, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 575
(E.D.N.C. 2001) (noting that artificial intelligence technology is used to tailor the tastes of
customers websites). Similar cases that acknowledged the role of artificial intelligence in technology include: Go2Net, Inc. v. CI Host, Inc., 60 P.3d 1245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); United
States v. Skys, 637 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2011); Smart Systems Innovations v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
55. On this latter argument see e.g., Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Approach to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV. 168
(1986).
56. Matthijs Maas, International Law Does Not Compete: Artificial Intelligence and
the Development, Displace or Destruction of the Global Legal Order, 20 MELB. J. INT’L L. 29
(2019); Thomas Burri, International Law and Artificial Intelligence, 60 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L
L. 91 (2019). For some provocative reading see generally Mireille Hilderbrandt, Algorithmic
Regulation and the Rule of Law, 376 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y (2018); Pamela Andanda, Towards a Paradigm Shift in Governing Data Access and Related Intellectual Property
Rights in Data and Health-Related Research, 50 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
1052 (2019); Jeffrey Ritter & Anna Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct
for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220 (2017); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017); Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic
Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders, 6 INT’L J. OF CONST. L.373 (2008);
John Linarelli, Artificial General Intelligence and Contract, 24 UNIF. L. REV. 330 (2019).
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to know how they contribute to global innovation law or the specific relationship they create in international law and what factors give rise to such
relationship.
A. THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL
REASONING

Alan Turing famously asked: “Can machines think?”57 In the same fashion, I am interested by this question regarding the emergence of modern artificial intelligence techniques: can disruptive innovative technologies think,
and if so, what are the implications for international law?58 The answer, I
suspect, lies within the early treatment of artificial intelligence and general
legal reasoning in the literature.59 Moreover, some case law can also point in
the direction of artificial intelligence and its evolution as a legal concept.60
As a point of clarification, I am not so much interested in the jurisprudential
character of legal reasoning,61 rather, I am dealing with the legal reasoning
of some scholars who examined artificial intelligence mostly in American
legal literature from the 1970s – in order to situate the historical dimension
of artificial intelligence.62
There is no doubt that the evolutionary nature of technology will always
pose complex problems for both the law and the interpreters of the law –
courts or the community of scholarly legal experts and concepts such as artificial intelligence present challenges for legal reasoning. The early technologies of the 1950s – 1970s that brought about computing required human interventions to create artificial intelligence. Such human interventions took
the form of how machines were instructed to behave (intelligently) and
57. Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433, 433 (1950);
see also Kevin Warwick & Huma Shah, Can Machines Think? A Report on Turning Test
Experiments at the Royal Society, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL A.I. 989 (2015).
58. See also Maas, supra note 56.
59. Susskind, supra note 55; Bruce Buchanan & Thomas Headrick, Some Speculation
about Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); PAMELA GRAY,
ARTIFICIAL LEGAL INTELLIGENCE (1996). For a review of Gray’s book, see Stephen McJohn,
Book Note, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 241 (1998) (reviewing PAMELA GRAY, ARTIFICIAL LEGAL
INTELLIGENCE) (1996).
60. The thinking is that if artificial intelligence is considered as part of the property
nexus in investments then such disputes for instance would require the invocation of international legal norms and the relationship of property as investments, but see Bridgestone Licensing Servs., Inc. & Bridgestone Ams., Inc. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/34,
Decision on Expedited Objection (Dec. 13, 2017). See also Ritter & Mayer, supra note 56
(discussing property and data); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2069 (discussing the commodification of data).
61. EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); NEIL
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978); PHOEBE ELLSWORTH, THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING (K.J. Holyoak & R.G. Morrison eds.,
2005).
62. See also Gray, supra note 59.
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thereby give rise to artificial intelligence. The drawback of course when compared to humans is that machines, then and now, still require humans to feed
the algorithmic instructions so that the machines can behave independent of
humans. Once armed with its algorithmic instructions and data, machines are
able to follow sequences of logical patterns – yet, unfortunately, are unable
to think – or at least think like the humans that feed the algorithmic instructions in the first place. The field of law – or to solve legal problems – is about
data – lots of data and this data has to be managed in technological devices
and/or printed form (which can also be transposed to fit technical devices).
So, the key issue now becomes – if law is about solving problems using data
– and artificial intelligence is about accepting how humans instruct technical
devices with algorithmic methods and data, then, can those technical devices
equipped with artificial intelligence reason, and is their reasoning legal?63
When some of the early literature addressed the novel intersection of
legal reasoning and artificial intelligence there was both optimism64 and caution that technical devices would be able to “simulate legal reasoning processes.”65 There were two drawbacks I found in most of the literature. Firstly,
they analyzed artificial intelligence in the context of document retrieval and
assembly,66 and, secondly, artificial intelligence would often be treated similarly to other “expert systems.”67 But regardless of these anomalies on artificial intelligence, the scholarly output had one central question – could/can
machines exhibit legal reasoning? According to one author, there was the
need to a draw a line between machines and humans when it came to legal
reasoning: such a line was a common sense one68 – a quality which machines
do not have.
63. McJohn, supra note 59, at 245. Quoted Gray’s concept of legal reasoning as a
process of “moving from one of legal data to the next to make a selection.” But see Cass
Sunstein, On Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
29, 33-34 (2001) (casting doubt on artificial intelligence and legal reasoning). See also E.C.
Lashbrooke, Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence, 34 LOY. L. REV. 287 (1988); John
Barnden & Donald Peterson, Artificial Intelligence, Mindreading, and Reasoning in the Law,
22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1381 (2001); L. Thorne McCarty, Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977); Edwin
Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99
YALE L. J. 1957 (1990).
64. Rissland, supra note 63.
65. Buchanan & Headrick, supra note 59, at 41.
66. Susskind, supra note 55, at 168. Already acknowledging in 1986 that the first
twenty-five years of computer technology to law largely involved “legal information retrieval
system[s].”
67. Lashbrooke, supra note 63, at 295. Noting the general lack of agreement regarding the concept of artificial intelligence, which he defines as: “the part of computer science
concerned with designing intelligent computer systems, that is, systems that exhibit the characteristics we associate with intelligence in human behaviour.”
68. Id. at 296. “Legal rules are often ambiguous and seemingly contradictory. The
ability to relate them in another context makes sense of the law.” Furthermore, he notes that
computer programs “always lagged behind the law[.]” Id. at 304.
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Perhaps, when we consider the fact that machines and humans are
equated on the same level when we take into consideration the common elements of the conception of artificial intelligence such as those posited by
McCarthy,69 Turing,70 or Lashbrooke,71 the only difference appears to be the
ability to deploy common sense in times of complexities. In other words, if
a technical device is fed with algorithmic instructions to analyze the violation
of a peace treaty by the Republic of X and the technical device proceeds to
launch a nuclear strike, a human can intervene to manipulate the technical
device’s data in order to cancel or prevent such a strike. Perhaps, it was in
the same vein Gardner72 managed to situate artificial intelligence and legal
reasoning in a neutral way – that is how to make artificial intelligence and
legal reasoning compatible. Yet, Gardner’s work is more practical – that is,
it has, as its objective, “to create a model of legal reasoning process that
makes sense from both jurisprudential and AI perspectives.”73 The model approach in Gardner’s work therefore reinforces my own position that the early
treatment of artificial intelligence in the legal literature is based on the conception of artificial intelligence as “projects” representing certain technological developments and not a one-size fits all conception of artificial intelligence. If this is true, then artificial intelligence – in a technical sense – today,
exhibit patterns of its recent history and represents “projects” such as data,
algorithms, platform governance, financial technology, drone technology or
“computational models of legal reasoning.”74
In considering how much artificial intelligence is linked to legal reasoning, the observable complexities of law will always separate man from machine and the ability of both to deduct and analyze whether there ought to be
a nuclear strike or is a nuclear strike preventable. The fact is, while artificial
intelligence may aid and abet the legal reasoning process such as reducing
the amount of time a human may spend on the available data (legal facts, case
studies, treaties, etc.) – algorithmic technical devices will still fall short of
the human common-sense approach. Both the human and the machine have
different faculty tools that shape their reasoning. For the machine – its algorithmic data – derives from the reasonable deductions that a human put into
its coordination for the purposes of a technical device. But given that laws
still remain a man-made process similar to how artificial intelligence is manmade, the human ability of reason and deduction are more important. What

69. McCarthy, supra note 54.
70. Turing, supra note 57.
71. Lashbrooke, supra note 63.
72. ANN GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO LEGAL REASONING
(1987).
73. Id. at 1.
74. On this latter subject, see KEVIN ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL
ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2017).
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the historical narratives reveal is that artificial intelligence began as “projects” relevant to different parts of the legal process, such as aiding the analysis of a problem or supplying data within a reasonable time. Artificial intelligence, in the historical sense, was not about legal reasoning even though
the literature analogously points in that direction – rather, artificial intelligence was part of the technological innovation process that conflated the idea
of legal reasoning. Legal reasoning has been and remains a complex enterprise where logic, deductions,75 and other mental elements require the faculties of a being as opposed to a thing.
B. MODERN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL VISIONS AND GOVERNANCE OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

If we proceed on the premise that the law is always slow to new technology – then, two key questions can be address based on this statement. The
first question is should artificial intelligence be regulated, and, secondly, how
should the state go about regulating artificial intelligence? In terms of the
first part of the question on whether artificial intelligence should be regulated, it is extremely rare to find those arguing the opposite, and as such, my
core concern is the form of the regulation. The broader related questions on
international law are primarily present elsewhere in the literature.76 For the
sake of simplicity, I am using the term artificial intelligence as a one-size fits
all regarding governance and regulation, even though, at times in the discussion I will point to specific laws such as on data privacy or health, autonomous machines, high frequency trading, amongst others that invariably includes “public law” as such. Moreover, it should be borne in mind, based on
my earlier analysis of artificial intelligence and along with standard practice
– artificial intelligence is foremost about data/algorithms and how they are
fed to a technical device.
A number of countries around the globe have developed polices on artificial intelligence or have taken steps towards the regulation of artificial
intelligence.77 This has arisen partly because the source of artificial intelligence, that is, data (and associated algorithms), has grown exponentially, and
75. Antonio Martino, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 154
(1994).
76. See, e.g., Maas, supra note 56. There has been call for a model convention. Andrey Nezamov & Victor Naumov, Model Convention on Robotics and Artificial Intelligence:
Toward International Regulation, 2 J. ROBOTICS A.I. & L. 205 (2019); John Weaver, Abhor a
Vacuum: The Status of Artificial Intelligence and AI Drones Under International Law, 54
N.H. BAR J. 14 (2013).
77. Council Directive 2016/679, O.J. (L 119) 1.; Aviv Gaon & Ian Stedman, A Call
to Action: Moving Forward with the Governance of Artificial Intelligence in Canada, 56
ALTA. L. REV. 1137 (2019). The US House of Representatives in February 2019 introduced
Resolution 153 with the intention of developing ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence.
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is being the target of collection by a number of non-state actors. At the same
time, due to a number of public law concerns such as breach of privacy and
constitutional limits, states and supranational entities are often being called
upon to set the legal limits as to how far non-state actors can collect or use
data. Moreover, the various technical devices and cloud systems that store
and or use data are often operating in a number of different jurisdictions and
thereby raise questions on which state has the jurisdiction over cloud systems.78
Some of the more critical areas that concern states and artificial intelligence that have implications domestically and beyond their territories are in
the areas of autonomous weapon systems (AWS),79 drones, and robots. The
increased militaristic reliance on artificial intelligence signals that urgent
standards or regulations are required in order to limit the governance or who
should control and use artificial intelligence in technical devices of military
standards. In recent times, the idea of “innovation-proof global governance”
has been mooted as resilient or adaptive for future military purposes and artificial intelligence.80 While this is a valid argument, and the fact that militaries the world over are source of innovation and needs to keep pace with new
technologies, one possible fault line with the innovation-proof argument is
that it reaches into the sovereign status of militaries. In other words, unlike
nuclear arms treaties, one must consider whether the Republic of X would
want to sign up to governance codes developed by the Republic of Y in order
to reign in military technology. Such codes, would in my view, pose “national
security threats” to states given that even at the internal level of states discussions on matters of “cybersecurity” (to include artificial intelligence) are
“mostly classified”.81
What the various approaches by states to artificial intelligence – and to
a larger extent – other developments in relation to innovation and the law
suggests that there is a need for regulation – and therefore the emergence of
Similarly, the Algorithmic Accountability Act, introduced in the US Senate seeks to fix flawed
algorithms that may impact personal lives. See H.R. Res. 153, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1108,
116th Cong. (2019). Non-Western countries such as India and Russia have also developed
national strategies on artificial intelligence and or in the process of proposing legislations to
regulate artificial intelligence. See ARNAB KUMAR ET AL., NITI AAYOG, NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2018), https://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/NationalStrategy-for-AI-Discussion-Paper.pdf.
78. P. Sean Morris, “War Crimes” Against Privacy: The Jurisdiction of Data and
International Law, 17 SUFFOLK U. J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2016).
79. Alan Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV.
NAT’L SECURITY J. 379 (2017).
80. Matthijs Maas, Innovation-Proof Global Governance for Military Artificial Intelligence?, 10 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 129 (2019).
81. Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on
Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INTL L. 583, 631 (2018).
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a new area of law. The content and purpose of any regulatory approach is not
the concern here – rather, the very existence of regulatory activities that gives
rise to a form of law is already an indication of innovation law. But the regulatory argument as it applies to general innovation is a complex one. Thus,
it might be the case that those who are affected by innovation (such as artificial intelligence bias systems in healthcare, cyberattacks or financial activities) may prefer regulation. The justification from a consumer perspective
must be weighed against how detrimental innovation is to the welfare of society. On the other hand, the producers of innovation, for example, those who
develop and deploy artificial intelligence or algorithmic commercial activities, would be quite cautious about regulating innovation. The idea of regulation in the technology sector, or at least in the areas where innovation
thrives, always sends a chill down the spine of innovators. This is because
regulation tends to diminish the capabilities of the innovation in the first
place. Moreover, given the fact that innovation often emerges from a competitive free market – for the state to impede that free market approach with
regulation can also deter the pace of innovation. Another factor is that innovation often builds through how private market actors are able to guard their
intellectual property rights, whether through statutory laws such as patent
laws or through trade secrecy. From this perspective, then regulation may
force innovators to breach the very existence of intellectual property rules –
if certain information needs to be revealed during the development of regulatory rules by the state for innovation.82
The justifications for regulation from the prism of international law is
also nuanced. We have seen how there are ways that artificial intelligence
invariably interacts with international – but the crucial question is how to
situate artificial intelligence in the international legal system. Let’s first take
the example of a model convention on robotics and artificial intelligence.
Should such a proposal become law – that is a treaty in public international
law – then it would follow the natural trajectory of how the law responds to
innovation and or issues that give rise to concern beyond the domestic state.
We can take lessons from the infringement of intellectual property since the
late nineteenth century across borders that gave rise to the Paris and Bern
Conventions and their modern incarnations in the TRIPS Agreement.83 These
treaty systems are interpreted and or to be interpreted as international law
and not separate systems. The same can be said of a potential treaty on artificial intelligence or a narrow convention such as the proposed robotics convention. Beyond hypothetical we could take the amended Vienna Traffic
82. DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY (1980) (developing in general a thesis on the dilemmas of regulating technology); Gary Merchant & Wendell
Wallach, Coordinating Technology Governance, 31 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 430 (2015) (discussing the need for a Government Coordinating Committee).
83. See generally P. Sean Morris, Private Intellectual Property Regulation in Public
International Law, 26 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 147 (2020).
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Convention84, for example, that responded to the needs of artificial intelligence in the self-driving car industry as how international legal instruments
are in the modern times keeping up to innovations and developments that
have international legal implications. Technological developments have always led to new rules or “methods of creating new rules”85 in the international legal system and nowadays the same is true for artificial intelligence.
Yet, other challenges for artificial intelligence and international law are
more complex. Let us return to the hypothetical nuclear strike mentioned earlier. What if such a strike was actually launched either by a human operating
a technical device from a remote location, or, the technical device, acting on
its own intelligent instructions? The key questions therefore become did the
operation violate international law (the sovereignty of nations) if the technical device carrying the nuclear warhead has to travel over the airspace of
several states? Another question is, could an international treaty such as the
proposed robotics convention or nuclear arms control treaty prevent the nuclear strike? The likely answer in both scenarios is “no” given that (a) artificial intelligence has not yet shown that it can prevent conflicts and (b) the
existence of international treaties to prevent conflicts (or arms control) are
deficient when it comes to innovation as they are mostly from a pre-artificial
intelligence era. In other words, if non-proliferation treaties have not or failed
to control the spread of nuclear technology or how such technology can be
deployed – then artificial intelligence – may also have difficulties doing the
same. In fact, artificial intelligence, it appears, seems to aid and abet military
applications that may include nuclear technology86 that can give rise to state
aggression.87
Naturally, there is no one way of enumerating the potential benefits or
challenges of artificial intelligence in international law. And, this is despite
whether such artificial intelligence is being used for military purposes or for
economic benefits by technology companies. Thus, for both purposes, that is
military use of artificial intelligence in the present, or for economic benefits
of artificial intelligence through technological disruptions, then artificial intelligence has to be embraced in terms of how it interacts with the rule system
of international law. This is what Lord Bingham would refer to as “the rule
of law.”88 For Bingham, the rule of law is applicable to both public and pri-

84. Convention on Road Traffic, supra note 19.
85. Louis Sohn, The Impact of Technological Changes on International Law, 30
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 10 (1973).
86. See, e.g., Matthijs Maas, How Viable is International Arms Control for Military
Artificial Intelligence? Three Lessons from Nuclear Weapons, 30 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y
285 (2019).
87. See Sean Kanuk, Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International
Law, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1571 (2010) (for a similar take using cyber conflicts).
88. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (2010).
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vate legal relations. And, applying this same argument to artificial intelligence in the context of how artificial intelligence exists in international law
– whether for military purposes or economic purposes – then artificial intelligence in these circumstances becomes a rule of law issue or, as I imagined
it, public law and private law matters in artificial intelligence. The relevance
of tying this argument of artificial intelligence to the rule of law in the international legal system is that it does not matter how artificial intelligence actually evolves given that the same basic legal questions are always asked in
relation to the different evolutions of artificial intelligence – is it legal?
So, as my earlier discussion demonstrates that there were early legal
commentaries on artificial intelligence in the 1970s – 1980s that focused on
robotics and legal reasoning as “projects”, and, for present purposes, it is the
same discussion that is taking place in relation to artificial intelligence and
disruptive technologies – is it legal? Thus, if the discussion on artificial intelligence is repetitive or follows a pattern depending on the evolution of artificial intelligence, such as digitization, platform governance and fintech as
“projects” for the purposes of the present time as opposed to robotics and
legal reasoning a few decades earlier – in the international legal context there
is no change to the rule of law in the international legal system per se. The
most notable change, however, relates to the international intellectual property system in relation to the protection of private property rights through the
TRIPS Agreement, since it was not in existence in the period that focused on
robotics.89 Thus, the rule of law as a system or norm in the international legal
context rests on the foundation that there is a safety valve that guarantees the
protection of sovereign and private property rights in any civilized society.
Furthermore, international tribunals such as the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) have confirmed that the rule of law is a cornerstone
tenet of the international legal system. In Free City of Danzig90 the PCIJ
noted that states are “governed by the rule of law”91 and, certainly, there is a
modern need for the same logic in relation to artificial intelligence. Therefore, the rule of law for both international law and artificial intelligence requires both the private and public legal system of states and how those states
interact with other states (and individuals92) in international legal relations.
But as international law builds upon the rule of law as a system to embrace artificial intelligence for military planners and states’ inter-military activities, the rule of law questions become opaque. In other words, is it legal
for states to use artificial intelligence to improve military capabilities, espe89. But see Morton Goldberg & David Carson, Copyright Protection for Artificial
Intelligence Systems, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 57 (1991).
90. Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the
Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65 (Dec. 4).
91. Id. ¶ 54.
92. Corporations or private technology companies that deploy AI – are individuals.
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cially if such capabilities violate international treaties? Could artificial intelligence biohack national laboratories and release infectious diseases and
thereby breach international treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.93 Can artificial intelligence create or cause armed conflicts? And, more
importantly, although raised in other fora, “how can international law regulate autonomous weapons” that uses artificial intelligence?94 How should international law respond under those circumstances?
My purpose is not to provide answers to these challenging questions for
the purposes of this article, rather I wanted to highlight them to show how
artificial intelligence as emerging technology fits into the broader dialogue
of global innovation law that this article develops. Hence, artificial intelligence should be seen as part of a technological revolution that constantly
changes the requirements for adhering to new developments for the application of international law. If those new developments involve managing autonomous weapon systems or improving the strike capabilities of nuclear
weapons, then in this perspective they relate to innovation in the global legal
system. It is this innovation that comports with my conception of global innovation law. Necessary precautions would be useful so that artificial intelligence, broadly construed, and or artificial intelligence systems do not
breach international legal obligations, but those precautions can be managed
within how the innovation evolves pertaining to, for example, a weapon systems or how artificial intelligence control biological laboratories under the
defence departments or private firms apparatus of states.
Bringing insights from “international law” on artificial intelligence to
shape the new system of global innovation law at least presents an opportunity to shape global innovation law in a way to respond to some of the
challenges that artificial intelligence presents for international law in general
and would under some circumstance be unable to respond. Global innovation
law should be able to respond to artificial intelligence and its challenges so
that any gap within the rule of law system can be addressed. This depiction
will help to strengthen the existing system of international law and global
innovation law would then be a system that represents the legal relationship
of disruptive technologies at the international level and also act as a homogeneous legal system in international law the same way WTO law forms part
of international law.

93. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
94. On this latter question see, e.g., Ted Piccone, How Can International Law Regulation Autonomous Weapons, BROOKINGS: BLOG (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/04/10/how-can-international-law-regulate-autonomous-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/PWJ3-JLQB]; Helin Laufer, War, Weapons and Watchdogs: An Assessment of the Legality of New Weapons Under International Human Rights Law,
6 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 62 (2017).
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C. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY SECTOR, DATA AND ALGORITHMIC
GOVERNANCE

In this section of the article, I turn to one area that has presented some
interesting legal questions pertaining to its rapid rise in the global economic
system – the financial technology industry (Fintech).95 Specifically, I want to
address two areas in Fintech – that also have implications beyond financial
services – regulating and governing data and its algorithmic operations.96 It
should be pointed out that the regulation and governance of data in the
Fintech sector along with its algorithmic operations relates to many fields of
law including financial law, intellectual property law, and of course jurisdictional questions in international law. However, I want to keep the narrative
in the context of this article as global innovation law and therefore focus only
on the regulatory and governance challenges that data and algorithmic operations in the fintech industry presents and how it actually fits into global innovation law. This limitation allows me to present a concrete core of global
innovation law in more detail, and, it also contributes to perhaps what is a
burgeoning field – regtech legal scholarship.97 There are two issues in particular that I want to address – (a) data as a product in the financial sector and
(b) the underlying algorithmic operations of governance in global finance.98
There is no doubt the operations and nature of global financial governance,
banking, and capital has changed, and a big role in that change has to do with
95. Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO.
L. J. 235 (2019).
96. See generally Barbara Cohn, Data Governance: A Quality Imperative in the Era
of Big Data, Open Data and Beyond, 10 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 811 (2015);
Tom Lin, Compliance, Technology, and Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM.
L. 159 (2016); Bart Sloot & Sascha Schendel, Ten Questions for Future Regulation of Big
Data: A Comparative and Empirical Legal Study, 7 J. INTELL. PROPERTY INFO. TECH. &
ELECTRONIC COM. L. 110 (2016); Kristin Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency
Trading in Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP. L. 833 (2017); Timothy Robinson, A Normative Evaluation
of Algorithmic Law, 23 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 293 (2017); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic
Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015); Dany
Busch, MiFID II: Regulating High Frequency Trading, Other Forms of Algorithmic Trade
and Direct Electronic Market Access, 10 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 72 (2016); Lynn LoPucki,
Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887 (2018); Philip Paech, The Governance of
Blockchain Financial Networks, 80 MOD. L. REV. 1073 (2017); Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding
Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role for the Law of Global Governance, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2018).
97. Vicki Waye, Regtech: A New Frontier in Legal Scholarship, 40 ADELAIDE L.
REV. 363 (2019). In perhaps, what is closer to my notion of global innovation law and the
“regtech” sector, see Benedict Kingsbury, Infrastructure and InfraReg: On Rousing the International Law “Wizard of Is”, 8 CAMBRIDGE INT’L L.J. 171 (2019).
98. For some of the nomenclatures associated with Fintech, data and algorithms see,
Danny Busch, MIFID II: Regulating High Frequency Trading, Other Forms of Algorithmic
Trading and Direct Electronic Market Access, 10 L. & FIN. MKTS REV. 72, 74–75 (2016). For
instance, defining algorithmic trading as “trading in financial instruments where a computer
algorithm automatically determines individual parameters of orders . . .” Id.
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data. Furthermore, algorithmic methods in financial trading have shifted the
art of financial trading from man to machines in order to increase “informational efficiency.”99 Even if the human factor has been removed, albeit allegedly, from machine trading of financial products, this does not mean that the
role of humans is entirely redundant. On the contrary, at least from my perspective and the application of the law and other regulatory tools – the actual
intervention of humans in the governance and regulatory system can help to
diffuse the necessity and interpretation of law.
In his instructive article, Paech100 observes that “the lion’s share of the
services provided by the financial service industry relates to data storage and
data processing.”101 This is perhaps an understatement, but it captures the
essence of data in the global financial sector.102 The natural question now
becomes how to regulate that data and what are the governance mechanisms
to address such data? In recent years, there have been a number of academic
pages devoted to data governance in the financial sector, not only from a legal
point of view, but questions have been raised from a variety of disciplines.103
What seems to connect most of this scholarship relates to the actual governance of the data that are amassed in the financial sector.104 The same question
also arises in the legal literature and therefore suggests how important questions relating to data and its regulation and governance has become.105

99. Ross Buckley, Reconceptualizing the Regulation of Global Finance, 36 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 242, 248 (2016). See also Dirk Zetsche et al., From Fintech to Techfin: The
Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 393 (2018).
100. Paech, supra note 96.
101. Paech, supra note 96, at 1079.
102. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
103. E.g., Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn, Marcel Goguen & Tony Porter, Big Data and
Algorithmic Governance: The Case of Financial Practices, 22 NEW POL. ECON. 219 (2017);
FRANCESCO RAMELLA, SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC INNOVATION (2016); Yan Carriere-Swallow
& Vikram Haksar, The Economics and Implications of Data: An Integrated Perspective, IMF
Departmental Paper No. 19/16 (2019). Some of the legal discussions include: Solon Barocas
& Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Karni ChagalFeferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 1 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 111 (2018).
104. WALTER MATTLI, GLOBAL ALGORITHMIC CAPITAL MARKETS: HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING, DARK POOLS, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2019).
105. Ugo Pagallo, Pompeu Casanovas & Robert Madelin, The Middle-Out Approach:
Assessing Models of Legal Governance in Data Protection, Artificial Intelligence, and the
Web of Data, 7 THEORY & PRAC. LEGIS. 1 (2019); Federico Ferretti, Not-So-Big- and Big
Credit Data Between Traditional Consumer Finance, FinTechs, and the Banking Union: Old
and New Challenges in an Enduring EU Policy and Legal Conundrum, 18 GLOB. JURIST 1
(2018).
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When Facebook proposed its own currency,106 (and now in hiatus) the
regulators were wary of such virtual currency107 given the amount of data
Facebook already controls via its online platforms.108 If, in a hypothetical
sense, Amazon.com were to launch its own virtual currency then, one would
reasonably assume that Amazon’s control of the internet109 would put it in an
advantageous position. But there is evidence that Chinese operators such as
Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu have a systematic control of data and virtual
currency and other financial services information.110 These evolutions of financial services and virtual currencies suggest that from a regulatory standpoint, there is room for the traditional issuer of currencies – central banks –
to play a more prominent role. Such a role could take the form of (a) participant, where central banks also issue their own virtual currencies, and (b) develop and implement the regulatory infrastructure for virtual currency similar
to that of traditional currencies.
The formalization, management, and deployment of data by using various computational devices or the creation of an algo-language for such data
through technical capabilities and coding to execute certain processes or instructions already raise the question of who should regulate or should this
entire algorithmic development be regulated.111 For the most part the very
development and evolution of an algorithmic system is a product of private
enterprises whether initiated and encouraged by data collecting systems such
as Google, Facebook, the Swap Data Repositories (SDRs), or the SWIFT –
the latter representing data in global financial transactions. Another question
that is often invoked is the level of transparency needed once regulation
comes into play (or even prior), however, the transparency narrative is not
106. See, e.g., Sam Gibb, Is Facebook’s Libra a Positive Development for Cryptocurrencies in General, 2019 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 20; Michelle Neitz, The Influencers: Facebook’s
Libra, Public Blockchains, and the Ethical Considerations of Centralization, 21 N.C.J. L. &
TECH. 41 (2019).
107. The European Parliament, for example, provided some response to regulatory
questions. Parliamentary Questions, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002268-ASW_EN.html
[https://perma.cc/K6AP-QWHD].
108. Facebook Inc., controls the Facebook platform, along with Instagram, WhatsApp,
Oculus VR, CrodTrainagle, and others. The Facebook Companies, FACEBOOK (2021),
https://www.facebook.com/help/111814505650678 [https://perma.cc/YX7K-YPSY]; see
also Matt Sneed, The Key to Regulating Facebook and Data Collection Companies is Transparency, 30 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 109 (2020).
109. But see Miranda Mowbray, The Fog over the Grimpen Mire: Cloud Computing
and the Law, 6 SCRIPTED 132 (2009) (discussing some of the early aspects of Amazon Web
Services).
110. See, e.g., Julian Gruin, Financializing Authoritarian Capitalism: Chinese Fintech
and the Institutional Foundations of Algorithmic Governance, 5 FIN. & SOC’Y 1 (2019) (offering a critique of the role of Fintech firms in China).
111. BANK OF ENGLAND, MACHINE LEARNING IN UK FINANCIAL SERVICES (2019),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/report/2019/machine-learning-in-uk-financial-services.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAV3-VUR3].
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the concern of this Article.112 The focus, however, is on the notion of “algorithmic governance” given that in my view an algorithmic process is part of
the natural evolution of the generation and computational process of data.
Hence, the concept of algorithmic governance in this Article is a designation
to demonstrate integration of data in the financial technology sphere as part
of a phenomenon that deals with regulation and governance. Thus, if data
generated in high frequency trading (HFT)113 relies only on the internal codes
and procedures of the firms that engage in this form of daily financial trading,
then such internal codes and procedures are arguably regulation per se under
the umbrella of non-state actors. However, if states through their financial
supervisory bodies generate certain best practices and rules for how HFT
should be conducted then states become part of the system that governs algorithmic transactions. In this scenario, the governance of HFT through nonstate actors will also enable state actors to become actively engaged in algorithmic governance since both state and non-state actors have interests in how
algorithmic transactions are conducted. The relevance of this example is that
it shows that algorithmic governance relates to how complex data transactions are first, a matter to internal regulation so that its complexities can be
understood for a wider non-specialist audience and second, the state as regulator can build upon the internal regulation of complex data transactions and
therefore adopt rules that do not eviscerate the economic potentials of complex data transactions such as HFT.
Naturally, in this example of HFT – very specialized technical devices
are responsible for executing the trades and in that regard such devices operate in theory based on how specialized instructions are given to them via
algorithmic software (artificial intelligence). It is the actual existence of artificial intelligence in algorithmic governance that gives rise to some of the
more complex legal questions that often touch upon rights,114 social and race
structures, privacy (personal data),115 or for the purposes of this discussion –
who, in terms of individuals, gets a loan/credit card or how firms execute
HFT. In a recent paper where the authors looked at HFT as an example of
data governance in the financial sector, they argued that there is a high risk
of human intervention into HFT in order to “manipulate HFT algorithms”116
and as such paves the way for “social location”117 in search of profits. In some
112. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, A GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR ALGORITHMIC
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (2019).
113. See, e.g., Nathan D. Brown, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the Lack of Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L.
209 (2012).
114. Karen Yeung, Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation, 12 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 505, 515 (2018) (discussing “social ordering”).
115. Lisa M. Austin, Towards a Public Law of Privacy: Meeting the Big Data Challenge, 71 SUP. CT. L. REV. 527 (2015).
116. Campbell-Verduyn et al., supra note 103, at 228.
117. Id. at 229.
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ways, such an observation on social location is not entirely new (when one
analogously looks at forum shopping), whether it applies to financial data or
elsewhere in the data ecosystem. What is however troubling is that the actual
financial markets and their “efficiencies”118 are undermined and in that way
require regulatory input from state regulators.
Part of the contribution of innovation in the financial system is that it
contributes to the emergence of global norms that can shape how law is
formed at the international level. This is despite the fact that there is no legislator in the international legal system. Hence, the emergence of global innovation law will be a joint effort that takes into account all the major actors:
the fintech innovators, platform governance operators, international institutions, and states. The normative structure that continues to shape the evolving
nature of global innovation law lies in the practice and theory of governance
– and for the purposes here – as it relates to global financial transactions and
innovation. The practice and theory of governance supports global innovation law especially for financial transactions and innovation given governance theory and practice is part of a broader system of the new global law.
The new global law is a phenomenon that embraces new and dynamic approaches to law, regulation, governance, and adjudication in the international
system. The new global law is both risk-taking and innovative. Hence, global
innovation law boldly embraces the disruptive nature of fintech, platform
goverance and other technological innovations that challenge law and technology in and beyond the nation state. Thus, the same way that a disruptive
innovator strives to serve a new market or extend the services in a current
market – the same way global innovation law responds to the extension or
strive to serve the new legal challenges that disruptive innovation brings
about. But because disruptive innovation is also linked to the governance argument, thereby involving the state, international actors, and the private innovators, there is always the need to ground how disruptive innovations, especially those concerning financial transactions, are seen as part of the global
governance system.
As pointed out elsewhere in this Article and also what has long been a
project of the international legal community, global governance exuberates
some form of public authority119 and therefore it is with the same authoritative force that attracts global innovation law. And, although different variables in the global governance context such as the interaction of public and
private actors drives the governance questions, the norms that give rise to
global innovation law are rather robust and deal with the practicality of legal
questions in defined areas (fintech, artificial intelligence, platform govern-

118. See Yadav, supra note 39.
119. Nico Krisch, Global Governance as Public Authority: An Introduction, 4 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 976 (2012).
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ance, and other innovations). Hence, how the law can deal with these practical problems certainly lends credence to the argument that global law (or
even international law) has always been at the forefront of the public/private
divide, and as such, enables the norms of global governance to insert themselves into legal questions. The benefit of this is that global governance
norms may contribute further to how the norms of global law are coordinated
and settle the battle lines between competing legal systems, such as private
law norms or public law norms, in relation to global innovation law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The examples of global innovation law that are proposed in this Article
are instructive in that they focus on some of the technological and legal challenges that permeate the global operations of contemporary law. Naturally,
the sample proposals of global innovation law can only benefit certain modes
and norms as it can be argued that different modes of law and technology can
also fit into the regime of global innovation law. It is also perfectly legitimate
for a counter argument to dismiss the idea of global innovation law, but any
such dismissal would need to give a thorough account of the process and
emergence of law, technology, and their interactions at the international level
that involve states, platform governance, private actors, courts, and international tribunals. The most useful way, however, of viewing and conceptualizing global innovation law is to view it as a system or technique in the international legal system.120 Such a system or technique can also be compared
to the “innovation,” “automation,” and existence of the tools that drive law
and technology across borders – artificial intelligence. The fact that these
techniques at the level of interaction of law and technology preoccupy the
scholarly community suggests that there are challenges and or some legal
nuances to be addressed,121 specifically, if such challenges concern the
framework of law at the global level.
Is there a prognosis for global innovation law? Not exactly, given that
there are still a number of unanswered questions, and key among them, is
whether global innovation law should be seen as a global regime or is it more
suited for a hybrid structure that is “trans-global”? This major question af-

120. Susskind, supra note 55 (discussing the concept of expert systems); Philip A.
Schrodt, Artificial Intelligence and Formal Models of International Behavior, 19 AM.
SOCIOLOGIST 71 (1988); Schuller, supra note 79.
121. One area that some of these challenges occurs in relation to present rules on the
intellectual property system concerns patents, see generally Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global
Artificial Intelligence Revolution Challenges Patent Eligibility Laws, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1
(2017); see also Nachshon Sean Goltz, Addison Cameron-Huff & Giulia Dondoli, Rethinking
Global-Regulation: World’s Law Meets Artificial Intelligence, 28 INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. L.
36 (2019).
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fects how other questions can be addressed, such as the future of global innovation law, or whether it is private or public law regime. Let me first address the terminological nomenclature. Although I imagined the concept of
trans-global in this Article as a cross between transnational law and global
law, to develop and defend that concept would perhaps be suicidal given that
global innovation law as a concept in itself is still untested and underdeveloped. Hence, in order to avoid inconsistences, trans-global has been invoked
merely as a narrative tool for the purposes of this Article. Despite this, the
notion of trans-global also invokes the normative divide between public and
private law, and as such, it is this example that will also require further elaboration.
In summary, this Article introduced and examined the system of global
innovation law as a phenomenon that rose from the regulatory challenges and
interface technological disruptions present to the law in a global setting. In
the Article, I argued that global innovation law is a system that relies on the
continuity of international law in the traditional sense but takes into account
the specificities of innovations and the law. Specific reference is made to the
fintech sector, artificial intelligence, platform governance, data governance,
and other areas to demonstrate how global innovation law emerges. The arguments in the Article are only a view through the window of how and or
what global innovation is and how it fits contemporary narratives on different
systems of trans-global law. Thus, further research is required to develop the
notion of global innovation law, its wider relationship with international law,
the role of private epistemic communities in the formation of global innovation law, and naturally, what are some of the dynamics of global innovation
law that separate it from other forms of trans-global law such as global administrative law or transnational law. But as the legal scholarship expands, it
is hoped that global innovation law is more than a catchphrase or technological development relating to the formation or evolution of disruptions in the
global economic system. Rather, global innovation law should be seen in
terms of the challenges posed to the law by the requirements of modern commerce and technological evolutions in the global economic environment.

